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This thesis consists of three independent chapters. To be more specific,
the bulk of my thesis aims to answer the following questions:
1. Does trade openness facilitate output growth via improving the access
to intermediate inputs?
2. How does corruption affect the pattern of trade?
3. How long is the duration of cultural goods export from China?
These topics seem to be diverse, but they are connected by the idea that
there are linkages between trade and development. The main objective of my
thesis is to identify the linkages, to quantify the costs and benefits associated
with them, and to derive relevant policy implications.
The first chapter, “Trade Openness, Intermediate Inputs, and Output
Growth”, investigates whether trade openness facilitates output growth via
improving the access to intermediate inputs. Specifically, we examine if indus-
trial sectors with higher intermediate input diversity will grow relatively faster
in those countries that are more open to trade. Through an adoption of the
difference-in-differences approach, we find strong evidence that this is true for
a large sample of countries in the 1963-2011 period. The results are robust to
a series of specification checks and unlikely to be driven by omitted variables,
vii
outliers, or reverse causality.
The second chapter, “Corruption and the Pattern of Trade”,1 examines how
corruption affects the pattern of trade. By adopting the measure of sales un-
predictability, our findings provide evidence of a novel channel through which
corruption plays an important role in shaping the pattern of trade. In partic-
ular, we find that corruption decreases trade volumes in a more severe way for
industries with a higher degree of sales unpredictability, as these industries are
more likely to be subject to the rent-seeking behavior. The trade-impeding
effect of corruption is both statistically significant and economically sizeable.
Our results are robust to controlling for a wide range of alternative explana-
tions.
The third chapter, “Survive and Thrive: the Duration of Cultural Goods
Export from China”, employs survival analysis to study the duration of cul-
tural goods export from China. We use the disaggregated product-level data
from 1995 to 2013 to explore the export dynamics of Chinese cultural goods
and investigate the underlying determinants. It is found that the early stage
of exporting relationship is characterized by the high hazard rate. However,
if Chinese cultural goods can survive in the foreign market during the early
stage, they will face a lower probability of failure and tend to survive a longer
1This is co-authored with Prof. Davin CHOR and Prof. Quoc-Anh DO.
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period. In addition, we find that the cultural distance is more of an obstacle
to the exports of cultural goods.
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Inputs, and Output Growth
1.1 Introduction
Does trade boost growth? This question of great importance attracts extensive
attention mostly on account of its vital implication for economic advancement.
So far examining the relationship between trade openness and output growth
remains one of the major challenges in the field of international economics.
In spite of a major wave of trade liberalization undertaken during the last
several decades, the debate on the causality between trade and growth is still
open (Rodr´ıguez and Rodrik, 2000 [93]). Ultimately, whether trade openness
has positive effect on growth is an empirical question, as theoretical literature
tends to provide mixed results based on diverse model assumptions. This study
thereupon aims to shed light on this topic and examines the relationship from
an empirical perspective.
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There are two major issues related to the empirical analyses of trade-growth
linkage: the way trade openness is measured on the one hand, and the iden-
tification methodology on the other hand. To measure trade openness, the
most straightforward approach is to adopt the ratio of total trade volume
(i.e., the sum of exports and imports) relative to GDP. This simple measure,
however, is subject to criticism with regard to the endogeneity problem. For
instance, better growth performance will lead to increased exchange of goods
and thus enhance the total trade volume, which could cause the bias in esti-
mation resulting from simultaneity. An alternative indicator of openness has
been proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995) [98] based upon several specific
trade policies, and afterwards revisited by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) [111]
with updated data. Since trade-related policies play a large and often deci-
sive role in defining the status of trade liberalization, the openness indicator
constructed using the Sachs-Warner criteria enables us to assess how trade
policies influence the outcome of growth. It is worth noting that the compos-
ite policy-based openness indicator alone is not necessarily a complete solution
to the simultaneity problem. Therefore, we employ a difference-in-differences
estimation strategy to further mitigate the concern about endogeneity, and to
better establish a causal link running from trade openness to output growth.
To deepen our understanding of the causality between trade and growth, it
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is instructive to focus on a specific channel through which trade openness may
affect output growth. In particular, increased access to intermediate inputs
could play an important role in promoting output growth when trade opens up.
The objective of this paper is to scrutinize whether trade openness facilitates
output growth via improving the access to intermediate inputs. The output-
promoting effects are expected to be more pronounced in industries where
intermediate inputs are more diversified, since these industries would benefit
more from trade liberalization. Therefore, we intend to investigate if industrial
sectors with higher intermediate input diversity will grow relatively faster in
those countries that are more open to trade.
The main contribution of this study is to provide concrete evidence that
industries diversified in intermediate goods will indeed experience higher out-
put growth rates in more outward-oriented countries. The empirical analysis
is conducted based upon 22 industries from 123 countries in the period of
1963-2011. More importantly, our results are robust to a series of specifica-
tion checks and unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse
causality. Firstly, a difference-in-differences estimation strategy is undertaken
to examine the research hypothesis. We incorporate an exhaustive set of pair-
wise fixed effects and control for a number of determinants as best we can
in the estimation. Secondly, our findings remain qualitatively identical and
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quantitatively similar after trimming the outliers. Thirdly, the concern about
reverse causality should be alleviated as we focus on the industry-level growth
rather than the country-level growth. Moreover, the carefully constructed
measures utilized in the estimation should be able to further shield against
the endogeneity issue.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section,
Section 1.2, reviews the related literature. Section 1.3 elaborates our research
hypothesis, illustrates the underlying rationale of the hypothesis, and eluci-
dates the estimation strategy employed to test the hypothesis. Section 1.4
describes the data sources and provides some summary statistics. Section
1.5 presents our empirical results, robustness checks, and relevant discussions.
Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Exploring the foundation of the relationship between trade and growth appears
to be a promising area of research. There is a large number of studies which
attempt to investigate the underlying mechanism through which trade liber-
alization fosters economic growth. In a remarkably influential paper, Frankel
and Romer (1999) [40] exploit an instrumental variable (IV) approach to dis-
entangle the causality in the estimation. Nonetheless, what they genuinely
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estimate is not the effect of trade on growth per se, but the effect of trade on
standards of living (i.e., income per capita). In addition, Rodr´ıguez and Ro-
drik (2000) [93] point out that Frankel and Romer’s geographically constructed
trade share of GDP may not be a valid IV, as geography could potentially affect
income per capita through other determinants besides trade, such as quality of
institutions and factor endowments. Moreover, Rodr´ıguez and Rodrik (2000)
[93] extensively re-examine a recent round of empirical research with regard to
the growth effects of trade openness, including Dollar (1992) [29], Ben-David
(1993) [10], Sachs and Warner (1995) [98], and Edwards (1998) [32]. One
common finding of these studies is about the positive impact of trade open-
ness on economic growth. In particular, Sachs and Warner (1995) [98] con-
struct a neatly dichotomous policy indicator of trade openness and affirm the
assertion that outward-oriented economies will typically outperform inward-
oriented economies in terms of growth outcome. Subsequently, Wacziarg and
Welch (2008) [111] update the Sachs-Warner policy-based openness indicator
and extend their study with more recent data. It is found that countries which
liberalize their trade regimes will experience average annual growth rates that
are about 1.5 percentage points higher than before trade liberalization.
In this paper, we aim to explore the interplay between trade openness
and output growth with a particular focus on the channel of intermediate
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inputs. Previous studies have shown that increased access to intermediate
inputs will enhance firm productivity in several countries, including Indonesia
(Amiti and Konings, 2007 [2]), Chile (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008 [62]),
India (Goldberg et al., 2010 [42]), and Hungary (Halpern et al., 2015 [46]).
One common feature of this strand of literature is to identify the productivity
gains from trade through imported intermediate goods based on plant-level
micro data. It has been established that industries are better able to achieve
production improvement and increase the level of productivity by importing
more varieties of intermediate inputs under liberalized regimes.
Apart from the empirical evidence, theoretical models also provide enlight-
ened insights into an understanding of the interrelation between trade and
growth through the impacts of intermediate inputs. In line with the empir-
ics, the importance of intermediate inputs for productivity growth has been
emphasized in numerous trade and growth models (e.g., Ethier, 1982 [34];
Romer, 1987 [95]; Markusen, 1989 [78]; Grossman and Helpman, 1991 [43];
Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991 [92]). In these models, increased access to in-
termediate inputs will generate both static and dynamic gains from trade.
On the one hand, when trade barriers are dismantled, output level will be
promoted by improving access to intermediate inputs that were previously un-
available or available but at a higher cost. The instantaneous improvement of
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productivity will bring about the static gains. On the other hand, access to
a wide variety of intermediate inputs after trade liberalization can also create
technological spillovers and lower the costs of innovations, which in turn will
engender the dynamic gains.
This paper examines whether trade openness facilitates output growth via
improving the access to intermediate inputs. The identification strategy under-
taken by our study is to make predictions based on the interaction of industry
characteristics with country characteristics. Fundamentally, the interaction
term in estimation specification arises due to the complementarity between
industries’ intrinsic features and countries’ essential particularities. Ever since
the reduced form difference-in-differences rationale provided by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) [90], research interest of focusing on this specific type of in-
teraction has been revived. By exploiting an interaction between the external
finance dependence at the industry-level and the financial development at the
country-level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) [90] uncover that financially devel-
oped countries will grow disproportionately faster in industries relying more
on external financing. Fisman and Love (2007) [39] revisit the results in Rajan
and Zingales (1998) [90] and further corroborate the hypothesis that financial
development benefits industries with global growth opportunities. As coun-
terpart examples, Beck (2003) [9] and Manova (2008 [76], 2013 [77]) interact
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country measure of private credit availability with industry measure of external
finance dependence to demonstrate that countries with better financial devel-
opment tend to export more in industries that are more dependent on exter-
nal financing. Through adopting an analogous approach, Romalis (2004) [94]
provides structural underpinnings of Heckscher-Ohlin forces, while Levchenko
(2007) [71] and Nunn (2007) [87] separately examine institutional impacts on
comparative advantage. Putting all these elements together, Chor (2010) [22]
extends the Eaton and Kortum (2002) [31] model to quantify different sources
of comparative advantage, which are determined by the interactions between
industry characteristics and country characteristics.
1.3 Hypothesis and Estimation
1.3.1 Research Hypothesis
In light of existing literature and previous analysis, we propose the following
research hypothesis: industrial sectors with higher intermediate input diversity
will grow relatively faster in those countries that are more open to trade.
The rationale behind our research hypothesis lies in the following consider-
ations. First of all, if intermediate good use is dominated by a few inputs for
certain industries, these industries are more exposed to hold-up problems in the
production process (Levchenko, 2007 [71]). For example, the major intermedi-
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ate input supplier may use this type of specific relation as a leverage to “hold
up” the producer who is heavily relying on that particular intermediate input.
Moreover, it has been well-established that the hold-up problem could lead to
detrimental economic consequences such as inefficiency and underinvestment
(Grossman and Hart, 1986 [44]; Hart and Moore, 1990 [49]; Nunn, 2007 [87]).
These resulting organizational frictions will bring about higher costs for pro-
ducers, which in turn negatively affect their output growth. In the next place,
the market of intermediate inputs would be “thicker” for industries located in
more liberalized countries. If the intermediate inputs are sold on a global mar-
ket rather than a domestic market, the scope for hold-up problem is limited
as the market becomes more competitive. In other words, hold-up problem
is more severe in those countries that are closed to international trade or less
outward-oriented. From a macroeconomic perspective, industrial sectors situ-
ated in more liberalized countries are less vulnerable to aggregate shocks due
to a richer array of practicable alternatives that are available to them. Fi-
nally, more accessible imports of intermediate goods could give a big boost to
the output growth. By adopting the cutting-edge technologies embedded in
imported intermediate inputs from more advanced countries, domestic indus-
tries will be capable of taking advantage of research and development (R&D)
9
abroad and thereby improving the efficiency of production.1
The research hypothesis has two key ingredients, one is linked to diversity
of intermediate inputs and the other is related to trade openness. On the one
hand, the Herfindahl index will be utilized to indicate the diversity of inter-





ij , where θij denotes the share of intermediate input j
used in industry i’s final good production. Clague (1991a [23], 1991b [24])
adopts the Herfindahl index to measure the self-containment of an industry.
It is found that developing countries are more specialized in production that
is more self-contained, as these countries have poorly developed distribution
and communication infrastructures. The Herfindahl index has also been used
as an indicator of input complexity in the literature (e.g., Blanchard and Kre-
mer, 1997 [17]; Cowan and Neut, 2002 [25]).2 In the context of our study, the
Herfindahl index increases with input concentration, namely, decreases with
input diversity.
On the other hand, in order to characterize trade openness, we obtain
a binary indicator from Wacziarg and Welch (2008) [111], which is built on
the Sachs and Warner (1995) [98] criteria. The openness indicator is defined
1For instance, Keller (2002) [64] provides notable industry-level empirical evidence of
R&D spillovers through trade in differentiated intermediate goods.
2Note that the complexity indicator is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index. It
equals to zero if there is only one input and tends to one if an industry uses many inputs
with equal proportions.
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on the basis of trade policies rather than total trade volume as a share of
GDP, which should mitigate the concern about endogeneity in our estimation.
We will elaborate on this point in more depth when addressing the reverse
causality issue in a later section.
1.3.2 Estimation Equation
We test the research hypothesis by estimating the following equation:
Growthict = α + βHIi ×Opennessct + X ′ictγ + Dic + Dit + Dct + ²ict, (1.1)
where i indexes industry, c denotes countries, and t represents time period here
and throughout this paper. The dependent variable Growthict is the output
growth rate for industry i in country c at time t. The coefficient of interest
β is on the interaction between the Herfindahl index of intermediate inputs
HIi and the trade liberalization dummy variable Opennessct. According to
the aforementioned research hypothesis, β is expected to be negative (i.e.,
sgn(β) < 0) on account of the fact that the Herfindahl index decreases with
the intermediate input diversity.3 We employ a variety of fixed effects in this
panel specification. Specifically, industry-country, industry-time, and country-
time fixed effects are indicated by Dic, Dit, and Dct respectively. This set of
3Recall that the more an industry diversifies in its intermediate inputs, the lower the
Herfindahl index would be. In principal, we can construct the diversity index as 1 − HIi
or just simply −HIi, which is increasing in the intermediate input diversity. Nevertheless,
doing so will not change the interpretations of our findings in any way whatsoever.
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fixed effects included in the estimation equation is exhaustive, in the sense that
only those explanatory variables that are varying by industry, country and time
simultaneously can be estimated. This should largely alleviate the concerns
regarding omitted variables and alternative explanations. In particular, the
estimate of β is essentially capturing how the within-country variations in trade
openness affect the output growth differentially across industries. Moreover,
Xict is a vector of controls for robustness checks, which will be discussed in
details later. In a conventional manner, α is the intercept while ²ict is the
idiosyncratic disturbance.
In addition to employing a set of saturated pairwise fixed effects, we further
control for other potential determinants of comparative advantage. To be more
specific, the vector of controls Xict consists of various interactions between
industry characteristics and country characteristics, incorporating overall de-
velopment controls as well as factor endowment controls. Firstly, it includes
the interaction between industry-level Herfindahl index and country-level real
GDP per capita. This is meant to isolate the effect of trade openness from
that of comprehensive economic development. Secondly, it incorporates the
interaction between industry-level Herfindahl index and country-level Polity
score. According to Marshall et al. (2016) [79], the Polity score characterizes
the institutional constraints. This interaction control is able to account for
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the episodes of democracy that may not be captured by trade openness or
real GDP per capita. Thirdly, it embodies the interaction between industry
indicators of financial vulnerability (e.g., external finance dependence, asset
tangibility) and country measures of financial development. This is to control
for the well-documented distinctive growth effects of financial development
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998 [90]; Braun, 2003 [19]; Levchenko et al., 2009 [72]).
For instance, outside capital would be more accessible to industries with higher
level of tangibility for the reason that tangible assets can serve as collateral
to raise funds. This contributing factor could in practice influence the growth
outcome of industrial sectors, especially for those that are intensive in upfront
fixed cost (e.g., R&D expenditure). Finally, it is comprised of interactions
between industries’ physical capital, human capital, and natural resources in-
tensities with countries’ corresponding per capita factor endowments. It has
been demonstrated that factor proportions are indeed important determinants
of production structure and international trade (Romalis, 2004 [94]), which will
translate into the sources of comparative advantage. Therefore it is of great
importance to control for the Heckscher-Ohlin determinants in our estimation.
To sum up, exploiting a full set of controls in this way allows us to further
shield against omitted variables bias.
Prior to the discussion of our empirical findings, we will describe the data
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sources in details and expound industry characteristics and country character-
istics in the next section.
1.4 Data Sources
The empirical analysis requires three major components: data on output
growth across industries and countries for different time periods, measures of
industry characteristics, and measures of country characteristics. This section
describes the data we utilize in our empirical study, explains the construction
of corresponding measures, and provides some descriptive statistics.
1.4.1 Output Growth
We obtain the output data from INDSTAT2 2014 ISIC Rev. 3 database pub-
lished by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The
data are arranged at the 2-digit level of the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) Revision 3 pertaining to the manufacturing sector, which
comprises 22 industries (see Table 1A.1). The INDSTAT2 2014 ISIC Rev. 3
database contains data for the period from 1963 to 2011 for 123 countries (see
Table 1A.2). The availability of almost 50 years of data makes it possible to
compare the growth performance of different industries across a large num-
ber of countries that are under liberalized and non-liberalized regimes. As
expected, the three-dimensional panel data are unbalanced.
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For the benchmark regression, the dependent variable is 5-year average
growth rate computed over non-overlapping windows. In addition, 3-year av-
erage and annual growth rates will be used for the purpose of comparisons.
1.4.2 Industry Characteristics
Our empirical strategy requires an indicator that captures the diversity level of
intermediate inputs for different industries. Specifically, we adopt the Herfind-
ahl index, which is computed from the U.S. Input-Output (IO) Use Table in
2002 (cf. Stewart et al., 2007 [106]), in order to characterize the degree of
diversity for intermediate inputs.
We follow Cowan and Neut (2002) [25] and construct the Herfindahl index
from the 2002 U.S. IO Use Table. The 6-digit IO categories are mapped into
the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 using the concordance tables provided by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the U.S. Census Bureau (CB).
Computing the Herfindahl index from the U.S. data is motivated by the
following considerations. Firstly, the existing structure of intermediate good
use is mainly driven by technological differences across industries and these
differences tend to persist across countries. Secondly, our identification strat-
egy does not require that industries have exactly the same Herfindahl index
of intermediate inputs in each country. It merely rests on the assumption
that the ranking of industries’ indices remains relatively stable for different
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countries. The measures constructed from the U.S. data indeed capture quite
a considerable technological component that is inherent in the manufacturing
sector and are thus reasonable proxies for ranking different industries across
countries. Finally, using the U.S. as a reference country is convenient in virtue
of limited data for many other countries in our sample.
In addition, we calculate the Herfindahl index of intermediate inputs us-
ing 1997 and 2007 U.S. IO Tables to demonstrate the stability of the index
ranking over time. Table 1A.3 lists the three least diversified (denoted by
the highest Herfindahl index) and the three most diversified (denoted by the
lowest Herfindahl index) industries in terms of using intermediate inputs, for
the year 1997, 2002, and 2007 respectively. As has been shown in Table 1A.3,
the ranking of industries’ indices is rather stable over time. For instance, in-
dustries such as refined petroleum products and chemical products are of the
highest Herfindahl index, which indicates that they are the least diversified
in using the intermediate inputs. On the contrary, industries including furni-
ture and non-metallic mineral products are with the lowest Herfindahl index,
which implies that they are the most diversified in using the intermediate in-
puts. Moreover, Table 1A.4 shows that the coefficients of pairwise correlations
are all above 0.9 for the Herfindahl index computed in different years. Hence
it is valid to use 2002 as the benchmark year to calculate the Herfindahl index
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in our empirical analysis, as supported by the preceding findings from Table
1A.3 and Table 1A.4.
The remaining industry measures of external finance dependence, asset
tangibility, physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, and natural
resources intensity are from Braun (2003) [19]. These measures of industry
characteristics are constructed using the data for all publicly listed U.S.-based
companies from Compustat’s annual industrial files for the 1986-1995 period,
with the exception being natural resources intensity that is a binary indicator.
As in Rajan and Zingales (1998) [90], external finance dependence is cal-
culated as the fraction of capital expenditures not financed by internal cash
flows. Asset tangibility is similarly defined as the share of net property, plant,
and equipment in total book-value assets. Both of these two measures are
averaged over the period 1986-1995 for the median U.S. firm in each indus-
try. It is worthwhile to note that the measures of external finance dependence
and asset tangibility appear quite stable over time when compared to values
computed from 1966-1975 and 1976-1985.
Physical capital intensity corresponds to the median ratio of gross fixed
capital formation to value added in the U.S. for the 1986-1995 period in each
industry. Human capital intensity records the median ratio of average wage for
each industry over that for the whole U.S. manufacturing sector for the 1986-
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1995 period. Natural resources intensity is a binary indicator that is equal to
1 for the following industries (and 0 otherwise): wood products (excluding fur-
niture); paper and paper products; coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear
fuel; and basic metals.
Table 1A.5 shows the summary statistics of industry characteristics, and
Table 1A.6 reports the pairwise correlations of industry characteristics.
1.4.3 Country Characteristics
In addition to the Herfindahl index, the other key element from the interaction
term of particular interest is the trade openness variable. We collect the data
on trade openness from Wacziarg and Welch (2008) [111], who update the
binary indicator originally coded by Sachs and Warner (1995) [98] after a
painstaking check of the Sachs-Warner classification of openness. Sachs and
Warner (1995) [98] construct a trade openness dummy variable based on five
specific trade-related criteria. A country will be classified as closed to trade
if it displays at least one of the following five characteristics: average tariff
rates are at least 40% (TAR); non-tariff barriers cover at least 40% of trade
(NTB); a black market exchange rate is at least 20% lower than the official
exchange rate (BMP); a state monopoly on major exports (XMB); or a socialist
economic system (SOC). Based on the updated data set provided in Wacziarg
and Welch (2008) [98], the trade openness indicator equals to 1 if a country
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is open to trade and 0 otherwise. It should be emphasized that a country
labeled as “closed” under this classification may still engage in international
trade but would in principle incur comparatively higher trade costs. Figure
1.1 depicts the number of countries that are open to trade throughout the
entire period of 1963-2011. In 1963, out of total 123 countries, only 22 were
open to trade based on the above criteria. A major wave of trade liberalization
took place between 1980 and 2000, with 63 countries switching from “closed”
to “open”. And yet 27 countries remained closed to trade after 2000. Figure
1.2 describes the percentage of world population in countries that are open
to trade. The share of total population living in countries under liberalized
regimes had increased from roughly one fifth to almost a half during the entire
sample period.
[Insert Figure 1.1 Here]
[Insert Figure 1.2 Here]
Apart from the trade openness dummy, the remaining measures of country
characteristics consist of real GDP per capita, Polity score, financial devel-
opment, and corresponding factor endowments (i.e., physical capital, human
capital, and natural resources) per capita. Real GDP per capita, physical
capital per capita, and human capital per capita are all taken from the Penn
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World Tables (PWT) Version 9.0. The country-level Polity score is sourced
from Polity IV database, which captures the regime authority spectrum on
a scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democ-
racy). As in Beck et al. (2000) [9], financial development is defined as the ratio
of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial intermediaries to
GDP, which is from Financial Development and Structure Dataset (updated
Nov. 2013). It captures the amount of credit channeled through banks and
other financial institutions to private sectors. Following Romalis (2004) [94],
natural resources per capita is measured by total land area divided by total
population, or equivalently, the inverse of population density. This simple but
arguably imperfect estimate of the abundance of natural resources is obtained
from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Table 1A.7 shows the summary statistics of country characteristics, and
Table 1A.8 reports the pairwise correlations of country characteristics.
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we start with the baseline results. Then we turn to the empirical
findings with overall development controls, factor abundance controls, and a
full set of controls respectively. After that, we revisit the results focusing on
different time periods and using the Herfindahl index constructed based on
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tradeable goods and services. Lastly, we provide relevant discussions.
1.5.1 Baseline Results
Preliminary estimates of Equation (1.1) with Xict being a null vector, are
reported in Table 1.1. The dependent variables are 5-year average growth
rate, 3-year average growth rate, and annual growth rate for Column (1), (2),
and (3) respectively. At a first glance, the estimated coefficient of interest, β, is
negative across all three columns, which corroborates our research hypothesis.
[Insert Table 1.1 Here]
With the aim of coping with potential heteroskedasticity, we report three
categories of standard errors in Table 1.1: (i) robust standard errors; (ii)
standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries, as in Bertrand et al.
(2004) [11]; and (iii) standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering within in-
dustries and within countries, following Cameron et al. (2009) [21]. In the first
column, the coefficient on the interaction term of the Herfindahl index and the
trade openness variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level
based on three different types of reported standard errors. Similarly, we obtain
a highly significant coefficient β with the expected negative sign in the second
column. In the third column, we also find the negative and significant effect of
the interaction term as predicted by the hypothesis. When annual growth rate
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enters the estimation equation as the dependent variable, β is significant at the
1% level when standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering. It remains
significant at the 5% level on the basis of robust standard errors as well as
standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries. As can be seen from
Table 1.1, standard errors adjusted for clustering within countries (shown in
parentheses) are the largest across different columns, whereas the other two
types of standard errors are relatively smaller. To be more conservative, we
report the standard errors clustered by country for the remaining tables.
Despite being all negative and significant, the coefficient of interest appar-
ently varies in magnitudes across different columns in Table 1.1. The absolute
magnitude increases as the length of time frame for calculating output growth
expands. The absolute magnitude estimated in Column (1) is almost twice as
large as that reported in Column (3). Meanwhile, the absolute magnitude of
β in Column (2) is approximately two-thirds of that in Column (1). It could
be said that the output-promoting effects arising from intermediate input di-
versity interacting with trade openness are more pronounced for the long-term
growth.
Since the difference-in-differences approach is adopted as the identification
strategy, one way to get a sense of the magnitude of the interaction term is
as follows. The industry at the 25th percentile of the Herfindahl index (i.e.,
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more diversified in intermediate inputs) is machinery, with the index 0.097.
Correspondingly, the industry at the 75th percentile of the Herfindahl index
(i.e., less diversified in intermediate inputs) is textiles, with the index 0.187.
Thus the difference between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of
the Herfindahl index is -0.09 in the sample of 22 manufacturing industries.
Similarly, the difference between the trade liberalization dummy variable de-
noting “open” and the one denoting “closed” is 1. Take Column (1) in Table
1.1 for instance, the point estimate implies that industry more diversified in
intermediate inputs (25th versus 75th percentile) will grow by 2.5 percentage
points faster in those countries that are more open to trade, ceteris paribus. 4
Likewise, the differences are 1.8 and 1.6 percentage points for 3-year average
growth rate and annual growth rate respectively.5
In the next subsection, we will scrutinize whether the baseline results re-
main intact when other determinants are further incorporated into the esti-
mation equation.
1.5.2 Robustness Checks
Table 1.2 reports the estimation results from a specification that embodies
overall development controls. By conditioning on industry measures interact-
4Note that the number is calculated as (−0.281)× (−0.09)× 1 = 0.025.
5Similarly, the numbers are calculated as (−0.200)× (−0.09)×1 = 0.018 and (−0.174)×
(−0.09)× 1 = 0.016.
23
ing with real GDP per capita, Polity score, and financial development, we can
prevent the estimated coefficient of interest from picking up those effects stem-
ming from overall development factors. Column (1)-(4) of Table 1.2 separately
take into account various of interaction terms, viz., (i) Herfindahl index with
log real GDP per capita; (ii) Herfindahl index with Polity score; (iii) external
finance dependence with financial development; and (iv) asset tangibility with
financial development. Column (5) includes the former two interaction terms,
since they are directly related to the key measure of Herfindahl index. Column
(6) combines the latter two interaction terms, as both of them are pertaining
to industry indicators of financial vulnerability interacting with country mea-
sures of financial development. Finally, all of the above controls are entirely
incorporated in Column (7).
[Insert Table 1.2 Here]
In the first instance, the top row of Table 1.2 indicates that the coefficient
of interest is significantly negative across all columns and remains approxi-
mately the same magnitude as the baseline estimation from Table 1.1. The
estimate of β in Table 1.2 suggests that our results are rather robust after con-
ditioning on overall development controls, although the real GDP per capita
and Polity score controls appear to be insignificant in the estimation. In the
next place, we find a positive coefficient on the interaction between external
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finance dependence and financial development, which is statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level. It confirms that industries more intensive in outside
finance will grow disproportionately faster in countries with higher level of
financial development, which echoes the findings in Rajan and Zingales (1998)
[90]. Last but not least, the estimated coefficient for the interaction of asset
tangibility and financial development is negative. It implies that sectors with
less collateralizable assets tend to grow faster in those countries that are more
financially advanced, albeit not significantly so. This is also consistent with
the results in Braun (2003) [19].
[Insert Table 1.3 Here]
We further explore whether the role of the Herfindahl index interacting
with the trade openness differs across subsamples of countries. Therefore, the
whole sample has been split into two groups, namely, OECD countries and
non-OECD countries, according to the level of overall development. Table 1.3
shows that our findings are mostly robust to the sample division, with the
only exception being Column (5). In terms of the coefficient magnitudes, it
could be inferred that the effects of trade liberalization are more pronounced
in economies with relatively lower level of development (i.e., non-OECD coun-
tries), which tend to be less outward-oriented at the very beginning of the time
frame.
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[Insert Table 1.4 Here]
The standard Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that countries rich in phys-
ical capital, human capital, or natural resources, are more likely to possess
comparative advantage in products that are intensive in those abundant in-
put factors. Table 1.4 demonstrates the impacts of Heckscher-Ohlin forces
on the pattern of output growth. Specifically, we control for countries’ log of
per capita physical capital, human capital, and natural resources interacting
with industries’ corresponding factor intensities. The coefficient of interest,
which still carries the expected negative sign, is significant at the 1% level for
Columns (1)-(2), at the 5% level for Columns (3)-(4), and at the 10% level
for Columns (5)-(6). One noteworthy fact is that only the physical capital
interaction term and the natural resources interaction term are occasionally
entering the estimation significantly. Moreover, Table 1.4 shows that indus-
tries more intensive in physical capital (respectively natural resources) tend to
grow faster in countries endowed with abundant physical capital (respectively
natural resources). This is in line with the canonical prediction delivered by
Heckscher-Ohlin model, which states that factor endowment abundances will
translate into sources of comparative advantage for industries that are inten-
sive in those factors. Therefore, controlling for the Heckscher-Ohlin factors in
the estimation does not seem to alter our main findings.
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[Insert Table 1.5 Here]
Now we turn to the results with a full set of controls and examine whether
previous findings remain the same. Table 1.5 encompasses all the controls that
we have hitherto examined, including overall development controls and factor
abundance controls. Column (1a) is the benchmark regression with 5-year
average growth rate being the dependent variable. It is worth noting that the
estimated coefficient on the interaction term of our particular interest, β, stays
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. As for the magnitude,
it remains virtually identical as the baseline estimate in Table 1.1, suggesting
that industry with higher diversity level in intermediate inputs (1st versus
3rd quartile of the Herfindahl index) will grow by 2.6 percentage points faster
in countries that are more liberalized in international trade. To gauge the
relative importance of all the explanatory variables in the regression, Column
(1b) reports the standardized beta coefficients based on the specification in
Column (1a). The standardized beta coefficient is meant to capture the change
in standard deviation units of the dependent variable induced by one standard
deviation change in the independent variable. In other words, one standard
deviation change in HI × Openness will lead to -0.231 standard deviation
change in 5-year average output growth rate. To further quantify the impacts
of all the explanatory variables, Column(1c) reports the factor changes of
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growth in the 75th compared to the 25th percentile industry and country. The
interaction of HI×Openness will bring about a change of 2.6 percentage points
in growth. Compared with other interactions, it appears to have the greatest
impact on the growth outcome. In Column (2), the dependent variable is 3-
year average growth rate. The coefficient on HI × Openness is still negative
and statistically significant (at the 5% level). The economic importance of the
interaction term remains sizable, as can be deduced from the point estimate.
When annual growth rate is used as the dependent variable, Column (3) shows
that β remains negative but only tends to approach statistical significance.
The estimated coefficient implies a differential of 1.5 percentage points, which
is still quite substantial in the context of output growth.
[Insert Table 1.6 Here]
As has been pointed out previously, it is the within-country variations
in trade openness that we are exploiting in order to estimate β. Since the
overall status of trade liberalization varies substantially across time, it is of
particular interest to split the entire sample period into two and re-estimate
the specification with a full set of controls. This exercise helps to identify
which time episode of liberalization is more important in terms of output
growth. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, a major wave of trade liberalization
took place between 1980 and 2000. We divide the entire sample time period
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into two using 1980, 1990, and 2000 as the cut-off respectively. The results are
presented in Table 1.6. Three major findings stand out. Firstly, we observe a
negative and significant β for the earlier time episodes (i.e., before 1980, before
1990, and before 2000). It suggests that, in contrast to the latter periods,
the earlier periods seem to be relatively more important for industrial output
growth. Secondly, the estimated effect stemming from the trade openness
interacting with the intermediate inputs diversity is remarkably pronounced for
the period before 1990, with the magnitude being approximately twice as the
benchmark regression for the entire period. Thirdly, the coefficient of interest,
β, is omitted in Column (7) for the period after 2000. To be more precise, it
has been absorbed by the industry-country fixed effects Dic in Equation (1.1),
as there is no variation across time in the trade liberalization dummy variable
Opennessct after 2000, which essentially degenerates to Opennessc.
6
[Insert Table 1.7 Here]
Given the emerging consensus on the importance of institutional compar-
ative advantage, we further control for the interaction between the Herfindahl
index and the institutional quality as in Levchenko (2007) [71]. Due to data
limitations, the institutional quality variable is not available for the entire
6As shown in Figure 1.1, the overall status of trade liberalization is quite stable after
2000. As we discussed above, it is the within-country variations in trade openness that
result in the estimate of β.
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period of 1963-2011. There are two major data sources of institutional qual-
ity: “law and order” from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) back to
the mid-1980s, along with “rule of law” from Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (WGI) mainly after 2000. Since variations across time in the Opennessct
variable are essential for estimating β, we thus use the “law and order” data
that are available for a relatively longer time span. The results with addi-
tional law and order controls are reported in Table 1.7. The estimate of β
remains virtually unchanged when we incorporate the interaction between the
Herfindahl index and the institutional quality. Taking into account the influ-
ence of institutional quality does not alter our main findings. Nevertheless,
the insignificance of β is largely due to the sample period, which is similar to
Column (3) and Column (5) in Table 1.6.
[Insert Table 1.8 Here]
It is worthwhile to note that the Herfindahl index is constructed using
all intermediate inputs, including tradeable goods (e.g., agriculture, fishing,
mining, manufacturing, etc.) as well as services (e.g., utility, transportation,
communication, financial intermediary, etc.). To better establish that the
growth-promoting effect from trade liberalization is indeed operating through
the diversity of intermediate inputs which are by nature tradeable, we perform
a placebo test by calculating the Herfindahl index based on tradeable goods
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and services respectively. One would expect to find a significant coefficient
for the Herfindahl index using tradeable goods but probably not so for the
one using service inputs, since the openness variable is measuring, by and
large, to what extend the goods could be freely traded. Table 1.8 confirms
that this is exactly the case. We find a negative and significant β in Column
(2), in which the Herfindahl index is constructed using tradeable intermediate
inputs. In contrast, an insignificant and even positive β appears in Column (3),
in which the Herfindahl index is based on service inputs. These results are not
surprising given the fact that trade liberalization usually pertains to tradable
goods, and should have less of a direct impact on services. Furthermore,
Table 1A.9 shows that the Herfindahl index constructed using all inputs is
highly and significantly correlated with the one based on tradeable goods,
and the coefficient of correlation is close to 0.9. It implies that the diversity
of all intermediate inputs is primarily driven by the diversity of tradeable
intermediate goods, which further corroborates our research hypothesis.
1.5.3 Discussions
In this subsection, to address the validity of our empirical findings, we provide
several related discussions.
In the first place, our results are less likely to be subject to criticism about
omitted variable bias. Firstly, this paper adopts a difference-in-differences ap-
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proach to examine the research hypothesis. The nice feature of this method-
ology is that we make predictions about growth differences based on the in-
teraction between industry characteristics and country characteristics. As a
consequence, it enables us to overcome the concerns about omitted variables.
Secondly, one of the major strengths of our empirical strategy is the ability to
employ an extensive set of fixed effects. Conditioning on a variety of pairwise
fixed effects in the estimation makes it possible to control for various unob-
servables and guard against omitted variable bias. Lastly, we also take into
account the determinants of overall development (e.g., real GDP per capita,
Polity score, financial development, institutional quality), along with the factor
endowments. These elements are generally believed to have potential impacts
on the growth outcome. Importantly, our results remain qualitatively identical
and quantitatively similar after incorporating all these controls. Altogether,
our empirical findings are robust against omitted variable bias problem.
In the second place, we trim the tails of the growth rate distribution to
inspect whether these results are robust to outliers. We re-estimate the same
specification after truncating the extreme values and obtain the same findings
as before.7 Reducing the effect of possibly spurious outliers through a trun-
cation leaves our results essentially unchanged. Moreover, we further exclude
7Winsorizing the tails leads to a similar outcome as truncating the extreme values in this
study.
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those countries with less than ten years of data from the sample. By doing
so, very few countries are affected in our sample.8 Once again, we retrieve
virtually identical results.
Last but not least, the reverse causality issue is limited in this study for
the following considerations. Firstly, reverse causality appears to be a major
cause of concern in the trade openness and growth literature. However, the
main focus of our investigation is the industry-level growth, rather than the
country-level growth. It is unlikely that the growth performance of manufac-
turing industry could have a huge impact on the timing of trade liberalization.
This helps to alleviate the concern about reverse causality. Secondly, the
openness variable is constructed based on relevant trade policies, as opposed
to the trade volume as a share of GDP, which is usually found to be posi-
tively correlated with the growth. The exact timing of trade liberalization is
arguably exogenous from the perspective of manufacturing industry. Finally,
the Herfindahl index of intermediate inputs is calculated using the U.S. data,
instead of being constructed individually for each and every country. This
feasible method also helps to shield against the endogeneity problem. The
variation in intermediate input diversity across sectors allows us to establish
8Seven countries with less than ten years of observations are Benin (BEN), Belarus
(BLR), Croatia (HRV), Liberia (LBR), Lesotho (LSO), Tajikistan (TJK), and Uganda
(UGA).
33
more firmly that the direction of causality is indeed running from trade open-
ness to growth.
Taken all together, we provide well-grounded evidence that our empirical
findings are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse
causality.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to shed light on understanding the underlying relationship
between trade openness and output growth with a specific focus on the di-
versity of intermediate inputs. We provide concrete evidence that industrial
sectors with higher intermediate input diversity will grow relatively faster in
those countries that are more open to trade. The estimation indicates that an
industry more diversified in intermediate inputs (25th versus 75th percentile)
will grow by 2.6 percentage points faster in more outward-oriented countries.
These results are not only statistically significant, but also economically siz-
able.
In the context of the trade literature, our study suggests substantial effects
of trade openness on output growth, which provides important policy impli-
cations. A broader lesson from this empirical analysis is that identifying the
mechanism through which trade openness facilitates output growth helps to
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evaluate different trade policies. Our findings point to additional gains from
trade liberalization that could be whittled down by increased protectionism,
and more so for industrial sectors that are diversified in intermediate inputs.
Finally, examining the microfoundations of the linkage between trade openness
and output growth remains to be an important topic for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Number of countries that are open to trade
Figure 1.2: Percentage of world population in countries that are open to trade
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Table 1.4: Results with factor endowment controls
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Table 1.5: Results with a full set of controls
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Table 1.6: Results with a full set of controls for different time periods
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Table 1.7: Results with additional law and order controls after 1985
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Table 1.8: Results with Herfindahl index for different input categories
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Table 1A.1: List of 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 industries (22)
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Table 1A.6: Pairwise correlations of industry characteristics
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Table 1A.7: Summary statistics of country characteristics
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Table 1A.8: Pairwise correlations of country characteristics
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Corruption and the pattern of
trade
2.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that corruption has an important influence on the eco-
nomic development. However, there is little evidence of the precise mechanisms
through which it affects the economic activity. In fact, the debate persists be-
tween a view of corruption as a distortionary tax that decreases economic
efficiency and a view of corruption as “greasing the wheels” of doing busi-
ness. On the one hand, corruption has been shown to lower economic growth
(Mauro, 1995 [81]), distort government expenditure (Mauro, 1998 [82]), and
impede investment (Wei, 2000 [112]). On the other hand, the notion “greasing
the wheels” was coined by Rose-Ackerman (1997) [97] to demonstrate that
corruption could be efficiency-enhancing in countries where other facets of
governance are defective, since it removes government-imposed rigidities and
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compensates the consequences of defective bureaucracies. To test whether
corruption “greases” or “sands” the wheels, Me´on and Sekkat (2005) [85] dis-
entangle the interplay between the impact of corruption on growth and invest-
ment, and a wide range of indicators of the governance quality. Their findings
tend to reject the hypothesis of “greasing the wheels” and support the view of
“sanding the wheels” on corruption.
Our study provides evidence that corruption acts as a trade barrier and its
deterrent effect is more pronounced in industries with a higher degree of sales
unpredictability. Specifically, we argue that corruption constitutes an impe-
dient as it diminishes the expected profit from trade. This impeding effect is
even stronger for industries where the sales of products are more unpredictable,
since contingent shipments are more prevalent for these industries and they
are more likely to be subject to the rent-seeking behavior within the customs
administration. Indeed, according to a large multinational survey of opinion
leaders commissioned by the World Bank (World Bank, 2003 [113]), customs
are generally ranked among the most corrupt government agencies.1 To exam-
ine how corruption impacts trade volumes across different sectors, we focus on
the corruption effect in exporting and importing procedures, including both
custom clearance and other administrative processes required for international
1The survey included 2,600 opinion leaders in 48 developing and industrial countries.
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trade. Corruption in customs, and other administrative processes required for
trading, impacts trade flows through the power to delay the goods in transit.
In effect, corruption may manifest itself as the bribe payment in exchange for
faster processing, which should be considered as trade costs that are accru-
ing to each transaction. Therefore, we expect that corruption has an overall
deterring effect on trade and a differentially stronger effect in sectors with a
higher degree of sales unpredictability.
To the extent that timely shipping is more important for goods with un-
certain demand, time-related corruption is equivalent to the trade cost that
is increasing in the time-sensitivity of the traded goods. Time-sensitivity is
defined as the rate at which the expected value of a given product decreases
with the time it takes in transit. We characterize it using the measure of sales
unpredictability built in Serfaty-de Medeiros (2007) [104]. The underlying ra-
tionale of adopting sales unpredictability as a measure of time-sensitivity, is
that, the ex ante expected values of goods decrease with time-to-market since
forecasting errors will increase with the time lag and hence create potential
over-stocks and under-stocks. For instance, by the time a product reaches
its destination, the market demand for it has vanished, its value drops sub-
stantially. In this regard, the existence of unanticipated variations in demand
levels is indeed an important source of time-sensitivity. The advantage of em-
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ploying the measure of sales unpredictability is that it has been constructed
for a large array of sectors using firm-level data and is distinctly interpretable
in an explicit theoretical framework by Serfaty-de Medeiros (2007) [104]. In
addition, it has been shown to influence the choice of air versus sea trans-
portation, implying that the sales unpredictability is indeed an empirically
important element of time-sensitivity.
We introduce an interaction term between the sales unpredictability at the
sector-level with the corruption at the country-level and find that its coeffi-
cient is significantly negative. Specifically, it is the variation in the effect of
corruption across sectors with different degrees of sales unpredictability that
enables us to identify the novel mechanism. The empirical results corrobo-
rate the hypothesis that the detrimental effect of corruption on trade flows is
stronger in sectors that experience a higher degree of sales unpredictability.
In addition, we incorporate an extensive set of controls for further robustness
checks.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section,
Section 2.2, provides a review of related literature. Section 2.3 describes the
data we utilize in the empirical study. Section 2.4 presents identification strate-
gies and estimation results. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to two main strands of literature, with one examining the
relationship between corruption and trade, and the other investigating the
interplay between timeliness and trade.
The impact of corruption on economic activity has been extensively de-
bated in the literature.2 On the one hand, corruption is viewed as an imped-
iment that distorts agents’ decisions and decreases economic efficiency (e.g.,
Krueger, 1974 [68]; Rose-Ackerman, 1978 [96]; Klitgaard, 1988 [65]; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993 [105]; Mauro, 1995 [81], 1998 [82]; Wei, 2000 [112]). On
the other hand, the beneficial effects of corruption can be justified by the
so-called “greasing the wheels” hypothesis, which states that graft may act
as a trouble-saving device, thereby leading to an improvement in the overall
efficiency of allocating resources (e.g., Leff, 1964 [70]; Leys, 1965 [73]; Bailey,
1966 [5]; Huntington, 1968 [59]; Lui, 1985 [75]; Beck and Maher, 1986 [7];
Lien, 1986 [74]; Rose-Ackerman, 1997 [97]). Knack and Keefer (1995) [66] in-
vestigate how institutional quality affects economic performance and point out
that more direct indicators are needed to properly account for the influence of
institutions. In the context of trade, Levchenko (2007) [71] and Nunn (2007)
[87] study the effect of institutional quality on comparative advantage and the
2See Bardhan (1997) [6], Aidt (2003) [1], and Svensson (2005) [107] for detailed surveys.
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pattern of trade. In contrast, our paper focuses on the impact of corruption on
trade and examines the underlying mechanism. Based on a standard gravity
approach extended to incorporate institutional quality indicators and price in-
dices, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) [3] find that corruption and imperfect
contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade. What differs
from Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) [3] is that a direct measure of corrup-
tion is embodied in our empirical analysis. Dutt and Traca (2010) [30] develop
a corruption-augmented gravity model and empirically identify the dual im-
pact of corruption on trade flows. The dual role of corruption, in terms of
“extortion” or “evasion”, hinges on the level of tariffs. More specifically, they
show that corruption itself could be either a trade-impeding extortionary factor
when tariffs are low, or a trade-enhancing tool to evade tariffs in an environ-
ment of high tariffs. Thede and Gustafsson (2012) [108] perform a detailed
examination of a systematic multifaceted corruption impact on trade. Their
estimation results provide strong evidence of negative corruption effects on eco-
nomic exchange. Using a rich dataset on bribe payments at ports matched to
firm-level data, Sequeira and Djankov (2014) [103] investigate how corruption
affects firm behavior. They further document the inefficiency of corruption in
transport networks and its potential costs.
There is also a series of papers that are specifically analyzing how the in-
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terplay between timeliness and demand uncertainty influences trade, location,
and modal choice (e.g., Evans and Harrigan, 2005 [35]; Harrigan and Venables,
2006 [48]; Hummels, 2007a [55], 2007b [56]; Harrigan, 2010 [47]; Hummels and
Schaur, 2010 [57]). Particularly, in a seminal paper, Hummels (2001) [54] ex-
amines the importance of time as a trade barrier, estimates the magnitude of
time costs, and relates these to pattern of trade. It is found that each addi-
tional day spent in transport reduces the probability that the U.S. sources a
manufactured good from a given country by 1% to 1.5%.3 Serfaty-de Medeiros
(2007) [104] takes a close look at how sales unpredictability affects the choice of
transportation mode and the distance elasticity. The paper develops a model
with heterogeneous firms under demand uncertainty along with empirical es-
timations of its predictions. It shows that firms facing higher unpredictability
have more incentives to choose air transportation over sea transportation. At
the sector-level, unpredictability predicts the prevalence of air transportation,
which in turn determines the distance elasticity of trade flows. In our paper,
the methodology of constructing the sales unpredictability measure is drawn
from Serfaty-de Medeiros (2007) [104]. Djankov et al. (2010) [28] study how
time delays affect trade and find that the overall time taken by administra-
3Hummels (2001) [54] estimates that each day saved in shipping time is worth 0.8% ad
valorem for manufactured goods. In a later version of the study, Hummels and Schaur (2013)
[58] report that each day in transit is equivalent to an ad valorem tariff ranging between
0.6% and 2.3%.
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tive procedures has a negative effect on trade. The estimation results of a
gravity equation indicate that each additional day that a product is delayed
prior to being shipped reduces trade by more than 1%. The size of the ef-
fect suggests that a one-day reduction in delays is equivalent to reducing the
distance to trading partners by about 70 kilometers on average. Martincus et
al. (2015) [80] estimate the effects of customs-related delays on firms’ exports
and show that customs-driven delays have a significantly negative impact on
firms’ foreign sales along several dimensions.
Our paper bridges the literature on corruption and trade with the litera-
ture on timeliness and trade. It contributes to the existing literature by pre-
cisely identifying how corruption deters trade through rent-seeking activities
in administrative procedures. More specifically, we show that corruption de-
creases trade more severely in sectors where products are more time-sensitive,
or equivalently, more unpredictable in terms of sales. In order to determine the
channel through which corruption hinders trade, our empirical analysis will be
focusing on the interaction between a pivotal sector-level characteristic, sales
unpredictability, with an important country-level institutional variable, cor-
ruption. One important feature of this identification strategy is that it enables
us to directly control for industry fixed effects and country fixed effects, lead-
ing to an estimation that has the identical logic as a difference-in-differences
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Data on trade flows are from BACI (Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce Inter-
national) developed by the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales). After reconciling the declarations and correcting for various
inconsistencies of the exporters and the importers, BACI has a larger coverage
of countries for which trade data are available, as compared to the original UN
Comtrade dataset (Gaulier and Zignano, 2010 [41]).
BACI provides bilateral trade data at the Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit
level. We map the 1992 version 6-digit HS categories into the 1987 version




The measure of unpredictability is constructed at the 3-digit SIC level, follow-
ing the methodology in Serfaty-de Medeiros (2007) [104]. For each firm in a
given 3-digit SIC sector, we obtain the unpredictable share of sales growth as
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the residual of a prediction equation including lagged values of sales growth
at both the firm-level and the sector-level,4 together with the quarterly dum-
mies accounting for seasonality. The unpredictability for each firm is built by
taking the standard deviation of the unpredictable share of sales growth. The
unpredictability for each 3-digit SIC sector, as one of the major industry char-
acteristics in the estimation, is a median value of the unpredictability across
all the firms in that particular sector.
To see the construction of the unpredictability measure more clearly, con-
sider the following prediction equation for each firm:










where t is the quarter index, St and S
′
t are the sales at the firm-level and at
the sector-level in quarter t respectively, ΔSt =
St
St−1




quarterly dummies, and the residual ωt is the unpredictable share of sales
growth in the prediction equation. The unpredictability for each firm is given
by σˆ = stdev(ωˆ), whereas the unpredictability for each 3-digit SIC sector is
taking a median value of σˆ across all the firms within the sector. Note that
4In contrast to Serfaty-de Medeiros (2007) [104], we further include the lagged values of
sales growth at the sector-level, which also appear to have substantial explanatory powers
in the prediction equation.
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the sectoral measure of unpredictability ranges from 0.027 to 0.181, with the
mean of 0.092 and the standard deviation of 0.029.
However, the measure of unpredictability is not available across a large
sample of countries. We therefore rely on the commonly made assumption
that the sectoral measure is intrinsic to each industry and does not vary dra-
matically across countries. Moreover, our identification strategy does not re-
quire that each industry has exactly the same measure of unpredictability for
different countries. It only rests on the assumption that the ranking of the un-
predictability measure remains relatively stable across countries.5 We take the
U.S. as a reference country to calculate the unpredictability using Compustat
database over the period 1990-1999.
Factor Intensity
Factor intensity variables are calculated for each 3-digit SIC industry from
the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Human capital intensity
is the log of the ratio of non-production workers to total employment. Physical
capital intensity is the log of the ratio of real capital stock to total employment.
Both variables are taking the average over the period 1990-1999.
5see Rajan and Zingales (1998) [90] for further discussion.
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External Finance Dependence
The external finance dependence variable is constructed following Rajan and
Zingales (1998) [90] using Compustat database over the period 1990-1999. A
firm’s dependence on external finance is the share of capital expenditures not
financed by internal cash flow. The median value across firms in each 3-digit
SIC category is adopted.
2.3.3 Country Characteristics
Corruption
The measure of corruption is sourced from Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) that are constructed based on a variety of surveys (Kaufmann et al.,
2009 [63]). In terms of the country samples, the WGI dataset has a bet-
ter coverage than other corruption perception datasets such as International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from
Transparency International (TI).
Focusing on a specific dimension of governance in WGI, “Control of Cor-
ruption”, we take the opposite of the index (i.e., multiplied by -1) to create an
indicator that is increasing in the level of corruption. The data are available
for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2013. The indicator of corruption
follows a standard normal distribution, with the mean of zero, the standard
deviation of one, and ranges from approximately -2.5 to +2.5, with higher
65
values corresponding to more severe corruption.
Factor Endowments
Human capital per worker and physical capital per worker are constructed
using Penn World Table (PWT 8.1) and World Development Indicators (WDI).
GDP per Capita
The variable of GDP per Capita is from Penn World Table (PWT 8.1).
Polity
The indicator of the democracy at the country-level is from Polity IV database,
which captures the regime authority spectrum on a scale ranging from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
Trading Procedures
The data on exporting and importing procedures are from Doing Business
dataset under the section of “Trading across Borders”. It records the number
of documents, the time, and the cost associated with the logistical process of
exporting and importing goods.
Financial Development
The financial development variable is from Beck et al.’s (2000) [9] Financial
Development and Structure Dataset (updated Nov. 2013). The level of finan-
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cial development is defined as the log of private credit by deposit money banks
and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
Prior to the discussion of the main empirical findings, we provide the summary
statistics of industry characteristics in Table 2A.1, the summary statistics of
country characteristics in Table 2A.2, and the pairwise correlations of country
characteristics in Table 2A.3. In addition, the industries with highest and
lowest measure of unpredictability are listed in Table 2A.4. Note that the
unbalanced panel dataset consists of 197 countries and territories (see Table
2A.5), 105 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries (see Table 2A.6) and 15 years
(i.e., 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2013, for which the data on corruption are
available) in the most extensive scenario.
We first take a look at whether a country’s corruption level is negatively
correlated with its trade volumes. Figure 2.1 plots each exporter’s log of
average exports (across different industries and years) against its average level
of corruption (over the entire sample period). Analogously, Figure 2.2 is the
importer’s counterpart.
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here]
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[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]
As can be seen from the two figures above, the correlation is indeed sig-
nificantly negative for both exports and imports. In addition, in terms of
the magnitude, the estimated coefficients differ from each other, with -1.15
for exports and -0.81 for imports. The magnitude differential implies that,
in comparison with the importers, corruption hinders trade flows in a more
severe way for exporters. Without taking into account the industry character-
istics, we find that the overall corruption effect on trade volumes is negative,
which is in accordance with a wide range of literature.6 The next step is to
further explore how corruption deters trade flows when incorporating the sales
unpredictability into our analysis.
Here we look at two specific industries with different degrees of sales un-
predictability: one at the 90th percentile of the unpredictability measure (i.e.,
more unpredictable), which is SIC 381 (search, detection, navigation, guid-
ance, aeronautical, and nautical systems, instruments, and equipment); and
the other at the 10th percentile of the unpredictability measure (i.e., less un-
predictable), which is SIC 204 (grain mill products). Focusing on these two
industries, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 demonstrate that the correlations be-
tween the level of corruption for exporters (respectively importers) and their
6For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) [105], Bardhan (1997) [6], Aidt (2003) [1], and
Svensson (2005) [107].
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export (respectively import) volumes remain significantly negative.
[Insert Figure 2.3 Here]
[Insert Figure 2.4 Here]
In addition to being downward sloping for both industries, the fitted line
for SIC 381 at the 90th percentile of the unpredictability measure, is obviously
steeper than that for SIC 204 at the 10th percentile of the unpredictability
measure. In other words, the trade-impeding effect stemming from corruption
is indeed stronger for an industry that is more unpredictable in terms of sales.
However, it should be noted that these graphical results are still preliminary,
since we have not taken into account other potential determinants at this stage.
We intend to systematically estimate how corruption shapes the pattern of
trade and proceed in the following three steps: (1) the pattern of exports; (2)
the pattern of imports; and (3) the pattern of bilateral trade.
2.4.2 The Pattern of Exports
For the pattern of exports, we examine whether exporters’ corruption will neg-
atively and more severely affect their exports in industries with a higher degree
of sales unpredictability. We test the hypothesis by estimating the following
equation:
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lnXikt = α + βexUnpredictabilityk × Corruptionit + Z′iktγex
+ Dit + Dkt + ²ikt,
(2.2)
where i indexes exporter, k denotes industry, and t represents time period. The
dependent variable is the log of exports from exporter i for industry k in year t.
The coefficient of interest, βex, is on the interaction between Unpredictabilityk
and Corruptionit. According to our hypothesis, βex is expected to be negative
(i.e., sgn(βex) < 0). Additionally, Zikt is the vector of controls, which will be
discussed in more detail later. Dit and Dkt are the exporter-year and industry-
year fixed effects respectively. In a conventional manner, α is the intercept and
²ikt is the disturbance.
[Insert Table 2.1 Here]
Table 2.1 displays the estimation results for the pattern of exports. When
evaluating the interactive effect of unpredictability at the industry-level and
the corruption at the country-level, we include exporter-year fixed effect Dit
and industry-year fixed effect Dkt. The reason for not including exporter-
industry fixed effect (i.e., Dik) is that the interaction term of interest mostly
varies at the exporter-industry level. Therefore the exporter-industry fixed
effect tends to soak up the variation of the interaction term, which leaves little
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to be explored. In addition to the panel results in Table 2.1, we also report the
cross-sectional results in Table 2A.7,7 which concentrate on the year of 2006
and simultaneously control for exporter fixed effect Di and industry fixed effect
Dk. For all the estimates, standard errors are clustered by exporter to adjust
the potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.8 As can be seen from
the comparison between Table 2.1 and Table 2A.7, the panel regressions and
the cross-sectional regressions lead to qualitatively and quantitatively similar
results. This is not surprising given the fact that it is the cross-sectional vari-
ations at the exporter-industry level that we are exploiting in the estimations.
Column (1) of Table 2.1 solely includes the interaction term of particular
interest. The negative and highly significant coefficient provides empirical sup-
port for our hypothesis, which confirms that corruption acts as an even greater
hurdle to the exports of goods with higher sales unpredictability. One way to
get a sense of the coefficient magnitude is to see how much smaller export
volumes would be for exporting country at the 75th versus 25th percentile of
the corruption level, and for the industry at the 75th versus 25th percentile
of the unpredictability measure. The interquartile gap of the unpredictability
7The specification in Table 2A.7 is: lnXik = α + βexUnpredictabilityk ×Corruptioni +
Z′ikγex+Di +Dk +²ik, which is analogous to Equation (2.2) with the time dimension being
compressed to t = 2006. Note that t = 2006 is selected simply because this is the very first
year for which all of the control variables are available in the data. It should be emphasized
that the patterns of cross-sectional results are very similar across different years. These
results are not reported due to space constraints, but they are available upon request.
8See Bertrand et al. (2004) [11] for further discussion.
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at the industry-level is 0.036 (as in Table 2A.1), while the interquartile gap of
the corruption at the country-level is 1.382 (as in Table 2A.2). The estimated
coefficient in column (1) implies that export volumes would decrease by a siz-
able factor of exp(−3.13×0.036×1.382) = 0.86, namely a 14% decrease, when
moving from the 25th percentile country and industry to the 75th percentile.
Column (2) of Table 2.1 controls for unpredictability interacting with log
of GDP per capita and the level of democracy, which is to ensure that we are
indeed capturing the effect stemming from corruption. There remains a neg-
ative and highly significant effect for the interaction between unpredictability
and corruption, albeit a modest decrease in the magnitude. Moreover, despite
the insignificance, countries with higher GDP per capita and countries that
are more democratic will export more in those industries with higher sales
unpredictability.
Column (3) of Table 2.1 further controls for the Heckscher-Ohlin forces, the
canonical comparative advantage factors, as well as the interaction term of ex-
ternal finance dependence at the industry-level with financial development at
the country-level. These determinants are all entering the specification with
the expected signs. It suggests that countries which are more abundant in hu-
man capital (respectively physical capital) exhibit higher volumes of exports in
those industries that are more skill-intensive (respectively capital-intensive).
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Similarly, the better financially-developed countries tend to export more in
industries that are relying more on external capital funding, which echoes
the findings in Beck (2003) [8] and Monova (2008 [76], 2013 [77]). The co-
efficient on the interaction between corruption and unpredictability remains
significantly negative, which is robust to the above controls.
Column (4) of Table 2.1 expands the set of controls to incorporate the trad-
ing procedures, which consist of the number of documents, the time, and the
cost associated with the logistical process of exporting. After separating the
effects arising from the inherent complexity of exporting procedures, the coef-
ficient of interest, βex, is negative and significant at the 10% level. The point
estimate implies that export volumes would decrease by a sizable factor of
exp(−1.75×0.036×1.382) = 0.92, namely an 8% decrease, when moving from
the 25th percentile country and industry to the 75th percentile. In order to
gauge the relative importance of all the explanatory variables, Column (4a) re-
ports the standardized beta coefficients from Column (4), and Column (4b) re-
ports the factor changes of exports at the 75th compared to the 25th percentile
exporter and industry. The interaction term Unpredictability × Corruption
is apparently one of those determinants that have substantial impacts on the
exports. The estimation with a full set of controls confirms the hypothesis that
the deterring effect is stronger for industries with higher sales unpredictability
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located in more corrupt exporters.
2.4.3 The Pattern of Imports
For the pattern of imports, we investigate whether importers’ corruption will
negatively and more severely affect their imports in industries with a higher
degree of sales unpredictability. We test the hypothesis by estimating the fol-
lowing equation:
lnXjkt = α + βimUnpredictabilityk × Corruptionjt + Z′jktγim
+ Djt + Dkt + ²jkt,
(2.3)
where j indexes importer, k denotes industry, and t represents time period.
The dependent variable is the log of imports to importer j for industry k
in year t. The coefficient of interest, βim, is on the interaction between
Unpredictabilityk and Corruptionjt. According to our hypothesis, βim is ex-
pected to be negative (i.e., sgn(βim) < 0). Zjkt is the vector of controls. Djt
and Dkt are the importer-year and industry-year fixed effects respectively.
[Insert Table 2.2 Here]
Table 2.2 presents the estimation results for the pattern of imports. Col-
umn (1) is the baseline regression and Column (2) includes a full set of con-
trols. To further quantify the impacts of all the explanatory variables, Col-
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umn (2a) reports the standardized beta coefficients from Column (2), and
Column (2b) reports the factor changes of imports at the 75th compared to
the 25th percentile importer and industry. We display the cross-sectional re-
sults in Table 2A.8,9 which are almost identical to the panel estimations. It
is found that the coefficient of interest, βim, is negative and highly signifi-
cant, which is in accordance with our hypothesis. The point estimate in Col-
umn (2) indicates that import volumes would decrease by a sizable factor of
exp(−1.69×0.036×1.382) = 0.92, namely an 8% decrease, when moving from
the 25th percentile country and industry to the 75th percentile. As has been
shown in Column (2a) and Column (2b), similar to the pattern of exports, the
interaction term Unpredictability×Corruption is of great importance among
all the determinants for the pattern of imports. These findings suggest that,
at the importer side, corruption also acts as a trade barrier, and even more so
for those industries that experience a higher degree of sales unpredictability.
2.4.4 The Pattern of Bilateral Trade
For the pattern of bilateral trade, we consider both the exporter side and the
importer side by disaggregating the trade flows into exporter-importer pairs.
The estimation specification is the following:
9The specification in Table 2A.8 is: lnXjk = α + βimUnpredictabilityk ×Corruptionj +
Z′jkγim + Dj + Dk + ²jk, which is analogous to Equation (2.3) with the time dimension
being compressed to t = 2006.
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lnXijkt = α + βexUnpredictabilityk × Corruptionit
+ βimUnpredictabilityk × Corruptionjt
+ Z′iktγex + Z
′
jktγim + Dij + Dit + Djt + Dkt + ²ijkt,
(2.4)
where i indexes exporter, j indicates importer, k denotes industry, and t rep-
resents time period. The dependent variable is the log of trade flows from
exporter i to importer j for industry k in year t. The two coefficients of par-
ticular interest, βex and βim, characterize how corruption affects the pattern of
trade through the channel of sales unpredictability for exporter and importer.
According to our hypothesis, βex and βim are expected to be negative (i.e.,
sgn(βex) < 0 and sgn(βim) < 0). In addition, Zikt and Zjkt are the vectors
of controls specific to exporter i and importer j respectively. We incorporate
exporter-importer fixed effect Dij , exporter-year fixed effect Dit, importer-
year fixed effect Djt, and industry-year fixed effect Dkt in the estimation. In
particular, the exporter-importer fixed effect Dij controls for the traditional
time-invariant gravity variables (e.g., distance, contiguity, colony, common lan-
guage, etc). The exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects (i.e., Dit and
Djt) are to capture the multilateral resistance terms demonstrated by Ander-
son and Van Wincoop (2003) [4]. Otherwise, the estimates of βex and βim
would be biased due to the omission of multilateral resistance terms.
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[Insert Table 2.3 Here]
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results for the pattern of bilateral trade.
Moreover, the cross-sectional results are shown in Table 2A.9,10 which are
again quite similar to the panel results in Table 2.3. For all estimates, stan-
dard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering by exporter-industry pair and
importer-industry pair.11 Several remarks are in order. First of all, across
different specifications, the coefficients are all negative and highly significant
for the interactions between the sales unpredictability and the level of corrup-
tion at both the exporter side and the importer side. Secondly, the corruption
effect appears to be more pronounced for exporters as compared to importers.
As indicated by the first two rows of Table 2.3, the coefficient magnitude for
the exporters is about twice to five times as that for the importers. Thirdly,
at the importer side, countries with higher GDP per capita and countries that
are more democratic tend to import a larger volume of goods from industries
that have a higher measure of sales unpredictability. In the meantime, at
the exporter side, countries with more documents required and higher costs
associated with trading procedures are inclined to export less products with
uncertain demand. Fourthly, in line with the existing literature, the Heckscher-
10The specification in Table 2A.9 is: lnXijk = α +βexUnpredictabilityk×Corruptioni +
βimUnpredictabilityk×Corruptionj+Z′ikγex+Z′jkγim+Dij+Dk+²ijk, which is analogous
to Equation (2.4) with the time dimension being compressed to t = 2006.
11See Cameron et al. (2011) [21] for further discussion.
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Ohlin determinants and financial development factor are indeed the sources
of comparative advantage for exporting. Last but not least, to get a sense of
how corruption affects exports and imports, we focus on Column (4) of Table
2.3, which controls for a wide variety of determinants. The point estimates
imply a 16% and a 9% decrease in the trade volumes, for the exporters and
the importers, respectively. The trade-impeding effect of corruption is both
statistically significant and economically sizable.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper aims to shed light on the interplay between corruption and the
pattern of trade. In particular, our findings provide evidence of a novel channel,
sales unpredictability, through which corruption hinders trade volumes. We
focus on the interaction between the sale unpredictability at the industry-
level with the corruption at the country-level and show that its coefficient is
significantly negative. The estimations corroborate the hypothesis that the
trade-impeding effect of corruption is stronger in industries that are more
unpredictable in terms of sales, as these industries are more likely to be subject
to the rent-seeking behavior. Our results are robust to controlling for relevant
institutional features and inherent complexity of the trading procedures.
These findings contribute to the understanding of the relationship between
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institutions and trade by highlighting a specific mechanism through which an
important institutional feature of countries, corruption, shapes the pattern of
trade. In a broader perspective, our results add to the current policy debate on
non-tariff barriers to trade. In terms of trade facilitation, merely simplifying
trading procedures is not a substitute to decreasing corruption levels. Chang-
ing regulations may be an important step, but corruption definitely hinders
trade well beyond the effect of cumbersome regulations.
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Figure 2.1: Exporter’s corruption and exports
Figure 2.2: Importer’s corruption and imports
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Figure 2.3: Exporter’s corruption and exports (90th vs. 10th percentile of
unpredictability)
Figure 2.4: Importers corruption and imports (90th vs. 10th percentile of
unpredictability)
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Chapter 3
Survive and Thrive: the
Duration of Cultural Goods
Export from China
3.1 Introduction
When countries trade with each other, how long can the trade relationships
last? To answer the question, Besedes˘ and Prusa (2006a [14], 2006b [15]) and
Besedes˘ (2008) [12] have investigated the duration of trade and found that
most of the trade relationships are far more fragile than previous thought.
These results are somewhat surprising since trade theories generally suggest
that the trade relationships ought to be long-lived. For instance, under the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, trade is based upon the differentiations of factor
endowments. When the comparative advantage is developed for a particular
product, the trade relationship tends to persist as factor endowments are rarely
subject to huge shocks. Similarly, Melitz’s (2003) [84] seminal paper suggests
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that the ongoing cost of servicing a foreign market is modest after the sunk
market-entry cost is made. Therefore, the trade relationships should be robust
once they are established. The sharp contrast between theoretical predictions
and empirical findings suggests that there is a remarkable amount of entry and
exit in the export market. From the perspective of exporters, entering into
a foreign market is no guarantee that they will be servicing the market over
a long period of time; said differently, they have to survive before they can
thrive in the export market.
This paper employs survival analysis to examine the duration of cultural
goods export from China, using the disaggregated product-level data from
1995 to 2013. We utilize the definition and the classification of cultural goods
made by UNESCO (2005) [109]. Cultural goods cover the following domains:
cultural heritage; printed matter and literature; music and the performing
arts; visual arts; and audio and audiovisual media. According to UNESCO
(2005) [109], cultural and creative industries alone are estimated to account
for over 7% of the world’s GDP. In particular, exports of cultural goods from
China constitute an increasingly important component in the global market.
Figure 3.1 shows that, during the period of 1995-2013, the export value of
cultural goods has doubled from $150 billion to $300 billion for the entire
world. Meanwhile, the number has increased from $12 billion to approximately
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$90 billion for China. Figure 3.2 indicates that China’s share in world exports
of cultural goods has grown substantially, from less than 10% to almost 30%
during the sample period.
[Insert Figure 3.1 Here]
[Insert Figure 3.2 Here]
As shown above, cultural goods export from China is indeed an empirically
important issue. Despite the importance of the topic, trade in cultural goods
from China has not been much studied in the literature, especially under
the framework of survival analysis. In this paper, we conduct the survival
analysis in two steps. In the first step, we use the Kaplan-Meier product limit
estimator to estimate the survival function in a non-parametric way. A nice
feature of the Kaplan-Meier estimator is that it is robust to censoring and uses
information from both censored and non-censored observations. We show that
the early stage of exporting relationship is characterized by the high hazard
rate. However, if Chinese cultural goods can survive in the foreign market
during the early stage, they will face a lower probability of failure and tend
to survive a longer period. In the second step, we use the Cox proportional
hazards model to derive semi-parametric estimates of the covariates that are
determining survival. In the Cox model, the baseline hazard function indicates
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how hazard changes over time, and the estimated coefficients describe how
hazard relates to a set of covariates. An advantage of the Cox model is that
the baseline hazard function is given no specific parameterization and thus
can be left unestimated. We show that the initial export value significantly
lowers the hazard rate, while the cultural distance increases it but not in a
significant way. In addition to the survival analysis, we further estimate how
cultural distance affects the exports of cultural goods and non-cultural goods
under the gravity framework. Firstly, we consider the full bilateral matrix of
countries. Secondly, we focus on the exports from China and examine whether
the effect of cultural distance differs for China’s pre- and post-WTO accession
periods. We find that the cultural distance is more of an obstacle to the
exports of cultural goods and its impeding effect remains the same even after
China’s WTO accession.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section,
Section 3.2, reviews the related literature. Section 3.3 describes the data and
explains how the measure of cultural distance is constructed. Section 3.4
conducts the survival analysis of cultural goods export from China. Section
3.5 examines how cultural distance affects exports and presents the empirical
findings. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Duration of Trade
The duration of trade is often overlooked in standard models of international
trade. Some models suggest that the pattern of trade tends to be static, while
others examine the dynamics of trade (e.g., Vernon, 1966 [110]; Krugman,
1979 [69]; Grossman and Helpman, 1991 [43]) and indicate a fairly predictable
pattern which evolves slowly. All these models appear to emphasize the stabil-
ity of trade patterns and seem to be incapable of explaining the short episodes
of trade relationships observed in the data.
Examining duration of trade has been inspired by the findings of Feen-
stra and Rose (2000) [38], Haveman and Hummels (2004) [50], and Schott
(2004) [101], who document that in any given year and for any given prod-
uct, many countries do not trade. In a series of papers, Besedesˇ and Prusa
(2006a [14], 2006b [15]) and Besedesˇ (2008) [12] provide a novel approach to
examine the duration of trade and show that most trade relationships are
short-lived. They investigate the duration of U.S. imports and find that the
median relationship lasts just one year. In contrast to the model predictions,
trade patterns observed in the data are surprisingly dynamic. Nitsch (2009)
[86] studies the duration of German imports at the 8-digit product level from
1995 to 2005 and shows that the majority of trade relationships exist for only
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one to three years. Besedesˇ and Blyde (2010) [13] point out that export rela-
tionships are generally short-lived but there also exists significant differences
across regions. In particular, Latin America exhibits lower export survival
rates than the U.S., the EU and East Asia. Brenton et al. (2010) [20] provide
evidence that learning-by-doing substantially improves the export survival for
developing countries. Besedesˇ and Prusa (2011) [16] examine the relationship
between duration and export growth and show that the survival issue is in-
deed an important factor in explaining the export performance in the long run.
Hess and Person (2012) [51] replicate the results by Besedes˘ and Prusa (2006b)
[15] using discrete-time hazard models and demonstrate that such models are
better suited for analyzing the duration of trade.
3.2.2 Trade in Cultural Goods
There are very few empirical studies systematically analyzing the trade flows
of cultural goods. Schulze (1999) [102] examines whether trade theory is appli-
cable for explaining trade in art. It is found that trade theory can be applied
to trade in reproducible art (e.g., books, movies, music), which is governed
by product differentiation. Nevertheless, it is not a good candidate to explain
trade in unique art (e.g., antiques, sculptures, paintings), which is character-
ized by exchanges between consumers. Disdier at al. (2010) [27] focus on
bilateral trade in cultural goods and investigate its determinants. They find
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that common language has the positive impact on trade in cultural goods
with a written support, while colonial relationship reinforces trade in cultural
heritage goods and visual arts.
This study is also related to the literature on how cultural proximity affects
the pattern of trade. Several studies have found that cultural proximity has a
positive influence on trade by reducing the trade costs.1 Linguistic similarity,
colonial ties, and bilateral trust are shown to be trade-enhancing. Our paper
adds to the literature on constructing the measure of cultural distance based
on Hofstede (2001) [52] and Hofstede et al. (2010) [53] and exploring how




Data on trade flows during the 1995-2013 period are from BACI (Base pour
l’Analyse du Commerce International) developed by the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales). After reconciling the decla-
rations and correcting for various inconsistencies of the exporters and the
importers, BACI has a larger coverage of countries for which trade data are
1For example, see Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) [18], Melitz (2008) [83], and Guiso et al.
(2009) [45].
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available, as compared to the original UN Comtrade dataset (Gaulier and
Zignano, 2010 [41]). The data are arranged at the Harmonized System (HS)
6-digit level. Note that out of around 5000 products, 151 are categorized
as cultural goods according to the classifications by UNESCO [109], which
are listed in Table 3A.1. Cultural goods can be grouped into the following
five domains: cultural heritage; printed matter and literature; music and the
performing arts; visual arts; and audio and audiovisual media. In addition,
Table 3A.2 displays the product structure of cultural goods export from China.
Panel (a) of Table 3A.2 indicates that China exports cultural goods to var-
ious importers. The median number of importers is 137 (out of 202). The
most common cultural product has been exported to 199 importers, whereas
the least common cultural product has been exported to only 4 importers.
Panel (b) of Table 3A.2 shows that on average, China exports around 100
(out of 151) cultural products to an importer. The U.S. and Singapore have
imported 150 cultural products from China, while Anguilla and Ethiopia have
imported only 1 and 2. Table 3A.3 illustrates the export spells of Chinese
cultural goods for a sample of importers. As shown, China has exported the
product “Pictures, Designs, Photographs (HS code: 491191)” over the sample
period from 1995 to 2013. However, not all of the importers have imported
the product from China every year. The black circle represents a year of an
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active trade relationship (i.e., the value is positive). The white circle denotes
a year of an failure event (i.e., the value is zero). The episodes of China con-
tinuously exporting the product to the importers are referred as “spells”. The
maximum length of a spell in the sample is 19 years. At the extreme, China
may export the product to an importer every other year so that there could
be, for a given product-importer pair, a maximum number of 10 spells and
9 failures. Calculating the duration is thus straightforward: it is simply the
consecutive time period that a trade relationship has been active.2 In addi-
tion, calendar time is not as important as analysis time, which is the object
of study in survival analysis. Analysis time is measured relative to the time
origin. Under the survival analysis framework, the dynamics of duration can
be modeled as a sequence of conditional probabilities, which will be discussed
in more detail later. Note that the total number of trade observations for
all possible combinations of cultural products, importers and years is 579,538
(151 products × 202 importers × 19 years). However, most of these potential
2One possible concern about the multiple spells is the measurement error. In particular,
if the gap between two spells is short, it could be that the gap is due to the measurement
error. It may be more appropriate to interpret the two spells as one longer spell. To allow
for such misreporting, a one-year gap between spells will be considered as an error. We
adjust the data accordingly by merging the spells with the one-year gap. Gaps of two or
more years are assumed to be accurate and no adjustment is made. For instance, in Table
3A.3, after adjusting for such measurement error, the length of spell will be 19 years (i.e.,
from 1995 to 2013) for both Colombia and Singapore, and 14 years (i.e., from 2000 to 2013)
for Guatemala. There are two spells for Dominica, with the length being 4 years (i.e., from
2001 to 2004) and 1 year (i.e., 2007) respectively. No adjustment is made for the other
countries. Our findings remain largely unchanged using the gap-adjusted data instead and
hence are robust to the measurement error.
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trade relationships are non-existent; the number of observations with non-zero
trade is 169,267 (about 30% of the sample). In addition, the majority of these
active trade observations are small in value. Figure 3.3 provides a histogram
of Chinese cultural goods export values by product-importer pair. About 60%
of export values by product-importer pair are less than $100,000; over 80% are
less than $1,000,000.
[Insert Figure 3.3 Here]
3.3.2 Gravity Variables
Gravity variables, including geographical distance, dummies for contiguity,
common language, colonial relationship, and landlocked country, are sourced
from Gravity Dataset developed by CEPII. The data of GDP and GDP per
capita come from Penn World Table (PWT 9.0).
3.3.3 Cultural Distance
Cultural distance is defined as the degree to which cultural norms and values
differ from one country to another. In this paper, the measure of cultural dis-
tance is constructed based on the indicators of culture from Hofstede (2001)
[52] and Hofstede et al. (2010) [53]. According to Hofstede’s cultural dimen-
sions theory, national culture consists of six dimensions: Power Distance Index
(PDI); Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV); Masculinity versus Femininity
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(MAS); Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI); Long Term Orientation versus
Short Term Orientation (LTO); and Indulgence versus Restraint (IND). The
cultural dimensions represent independent preferences for one state of affairs
over another that distinguish countries (rather than individuals) from each
other. The country scores on the dimensions are relative. In other words,
culture can be only used meaningfully by comparison. The values of these
six indicators are between 0 and 100, with detailed explanations provided in
Table 3A.4. Following Kogut and Singh (1988) [67], the measure of cultural






(Iik − Ijk)2/Vk, (3.1)
where CulDistij is the cultural distance between country i and country j. K
is the number of cultural indicators (indexed by k). Iik and Ijk are the values
of indicator k, for country i and country j, respectively. Vk is the variance of
indicator k over all countries in the sample. Table 3A.5 shows the importers
with short and long cultural distance to China. Importers such as Hong Kong
and Singapore are quite close to China in terms of cultural distance, while Den-
mark and Sweden are far away.3 In addition, it is worth noting that there is no
systematic correlation between the cultural and the geographical distances to
3Due to the geographical proximity, Hong Kong may have engaged in re-exportation of
goods from China to the rest of the world. However, it should be emphasized that our
results remain virtually unchanged after excluding Hong Kong from the sample.
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China across all the importers. The coefficient of pairwise correlation between




Since time is discrete in our analysis, let T be a non-negative and discrete
random variable denoting the time to a failure event. Suppose T is taking the
value of ti with the corresponding probability density function p(ti) = Pr(T =
ti), where i = 1, 2, ..., n and 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < ... < tn. The survival function for
a random variable T is given by:




The hazard function is given by:
h(ti) = Pr(T = ti | T ≥ ti) = p(ti)
S(ti−1)
, (3.3)
where S(t0) = 1.







The estimator of Kaplan and Meier (1958) [61] is a non-parametric estimate of
the survival function S(t), which is the probability of survival past time t, or
equivalently, the probability of failing after time t. The Kaplan-Meier product








where ni is the number of subjects at risk of failing at time ti, and di is the
number of observed failures at time ti.
The hazard function is estimated by taking the ratio between the number





An important advantage of the Kaplan-Meier estimator is that it takes into
account both censored and non-censored observations. The estimator follows
the philosophy of non-parametric analysis, which is letting the data speak for
themselves and making no assumptions of the functional form of the survival
function.
[Insert Figure 3.4 Here]
Figure 3.4 shows the estimated survival function Sˆ(t), which is downward
sloping with a decreasing slope. The hazard rate is particularly high for the
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first few years, and then decreases rapidly. Most of the export relationships
are short-lived, with the median duration of just one year. As can be seen
from Figure 3.4, only a quarter of export relationships can survive after the
first year. However, once a relationship is established and has survived the
first few years, it is highly likely to survive a longer period. Among all the
export relationships that have survived after the first year, about half of them
will span the entire sample period. The pattern indicates negative duration
dependence, that is, the conditional probability of failure decreases as dura-
tion increases. This finding is consistent with that documented by Pakes and
Ericson (1998) [89].4
3.4.3 Semi-parametric Estimation
The Kaplan-Meier estimator is one of the most frequently used methods for
survival analysis. Nonetheless, it is limited in its ability to estimate covariate-
adjusted survival. In contrast, the Cox (1972) [26] proportional hazards model
provides a semi-parametric estimate of survival adjusted for covariates. The
proportional hazards condition assumes that covariates mutiplicatively shift
the baseline hazard function. In the Cox model, the hazard function h is
4They consider two models of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms,
idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcome (exit and/or
entry): a Bayesian learning model due to Jovanovic (1982) [60], and a model of research
and exploration due to Ericson and Pakes (1995) [33]. They show that the first model with
passive Bayesian learning is consistent with the data on retail trade.
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parameterized as the following:
h(t, x, β) = h0(t)exp(x
′β), (3.7)
where t denotes survival time, x is a set of explanatory variables, and β is
a vector of coefficients to be estimated from the data. The baseline hazard
function, h0(t), characterizes how the hazard function, h, changes as a func-
tion of survival time t. A nice feature of the Cox model is that the baseline
hazard function h0(t) is given no specific parameterization and thus can be
left unestimated.
[Insert Table 3.1 Here]
Table 3.1 presents the estimation results using the Cox proportional haz-
ards model. We control for traditional gravity variables, cultural distance, and
initial export value in the Cox model. Column (1) reports the coefficients and
Column (2) reports the corresponding hazard ratios. Note that an estimated
hazard ratio less (greater) than 1 implies that the variable lowers (raises) the
hazard rate. As can be seen from Table 3.1, initial export value and GDP
per capita significantly lower the hazard rate. In particular, the finding that
duration increases with initial export value is in accordance with the match-
ing model in Rauch and Watson (2003) [91]. A larger initial order implies a
more robust exporter-importer relationship, which in turn increases the dura-
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tion. Longer cultural distance is associated with higher hazard rates and thus
shorter spells. Nevertheless, this effect is not significant.
3.5 Cultural Distance and Exports
In this section, we further explore how cultural distance affects the exports of
cultural goods and non-cultural goods under the gravity framework. Firstly,
we consider the full bilateral matrix of countries. Secondly, we focus on the
exports from China and examine whether the effect of cultural distance differs
with regard to China’s pre- and post-WTO accession periods.
3.5.1 Estimation of Gravity Equation by OLS
We estimate the gravity equation for the full bilateral matrix of countries using
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator:
lnXijt = β1ln(GeoDistij) + β2ln(CulDistij) + β3Contigij
+ β4Comlangij + β5Colonyij + Dit + Djt + ²ijt,
(3.8)
where i indicates exporter, j denotes importer, and t represents time period.
The dependent variable lnXijt is the log of aggregate exports from exporter
i to importer j in year t. The explanatory variables in the gravity equation
are comprised of log of geographical distance, log of cultural distance, contigu-
ity dummy, common language dummy, and colonial relationship dummy. We
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include exporter-year fixed effect Dit and importer-year fixed effect Djt to con-
trol for the multilateral resistance (MR) terms (Anderson and Van Wincoop,
2003 [4]).
[Insert Table 3.2 Here]
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results by OLS. Column (1), (2), and
(3) focus on the exports of all goods, cultural-goods, and non-cultural goods,
respectively. The canonical gravity variables, including geographical distance,
dummies for contiguity, common language, and colonial relationship, are all
entering the gravity equation significantly with the expected signs. As for
the cultural distance, it significantly hinders the exports of cultural goods.
Every 1% increase in the bilateral cultural distance will reduce the volume of
cultural goods exports by 0.15%. However, the effects of cultural distance are
negligible for the exports of all goods and non-cultural goods. In other words,
the cultural distance is more of an obstacle to the exports of cultural goods.
3.5.2 Estimation of Gravity Equation by PPML
In addition to the OLS estimation, we also estimate the gravity equation us-
ing the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, following the
recommendations made by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006 [99], 2011 [100])
who argue in favor of the PPML estimator to make use of the information
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contained in the zero trade flows and to account for the heteroskedasticity. In
addition, Fally (2015) [36] shows that when the gravity equation is estimated
with PPML, the estimated fixed effects are exactly equal to their structural
gravity counterparts (i.e., the MR terms). Taking these considerations into
account, we employ the following PPML estimation:
Xijt = exp{β1ln(GeoDistij) + β2ln(CulDistij) + β3Contigij
+ β4Comlangij + β5Colonyij + Dit + Djt}+ ²ijt,
(3.9)
where the dependent variable Xijt is the aggregate exports from exporter i to
importer j in year t, and the explanatory variables are the same as those in
Equation (3.8).
[Insert Table 3.3 Here]
Table 3.3 displays the estimation results by PPML, which are qualitatively
similar to those by OLS. The negative effects of cultural distance on exports
are more pronounced for cultural goods, as indicated by the magnitude of
coefficient as well as the level of significance. So far we have examined how
cultural distance affects exports using the full bilateral matrix of countries.
The OLS estimation and the PPML estimation corroborate each other. The
next step is to explore how cultural distance impacts the exports from China.
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3.5.3 Cultural Distance and Exports from China
To examine how cultural distance affects the exports from China, we estimate
the following equation:
lnXjt = β1ln(GeoDistj) + β2ln(CulDistj) + β3ln(GDPjt) + β4ln(GDPPCjt)
+ β5Contigj + β6Comlangj + β7Landlockedj + Dt + ²jt,
(3.10)
where j denotes importer and t represents time period. The dependent variable
lnXjt is the log of aggregate exports from China to importer j in year t. The
explanatory variables in the regression include log of geographical distance, log
of cultural distance, log of GDP, log of GDP per capita, contiguity dummy,
common language dummy, and landlocked country dummy.5 The year fixed
effect Dt is incorporated in the estimation.
[Insert Table 3.4 Here]
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results. Column (1), (2), and (3) focus on
the exports of all goods, cultural-goods, and non-cultural goods from China,
respectively. Several findings stand out as noteworthy. Firstly, geographi-
cal distance has a negative and significant effect on the exports of all goods
and non-cultural goods, but not on the exports of cultural goods. Secondly,
5Note that the colonial relationship dummy is always equal to zero (i.e., no colonial ties)
between China and all the importers. Therefore, it is not included in Equation (3.10).
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cultural distance impedes the exports of all goods, cultural goods, and non-
cultural goods. This impeding effect appears to be stronger for cultural goods,
although it is not significant. Every 1% increase in the cultural distance be-
tween China and the importer will decrease the exports of cultural goods from
China by 0.17%. Thirdly, log of GDP, log of GDP per capita, and common
language facilitate the exports from China across all three categories of goods.
We further examine whether the effect of cultural distance differs with re-
gard to China’s pre- and post-WTO accession periods. Based on Equation
(3.10), we introduce an interaction term between log of cultural distance and
a dummy variable indicating the post-WTO accession.
lnXjt = β1ln(GeoDistj) + β2ln(CulDistj) + β3ln(CulDistj)× Post2001t
+ β4ln(GDPjt) + β5ln(GDPPCjt) + β6Contigj + β7Comlangj
+ β8Landlockedj + Dt + ²jt,
(3.11)
where the dummy variable Post2001t = 1 for all t after 2001.
[Insert Table 3.5 Here]
As can be seen from Table 3.5, Column (1) and Column (3) suggest that,
when it comes to the exports of all goods and non-cultural goods, the imped-
ing effect of cultural distance will be reduced to one third after China’s WTO
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accession. It appears that China’s WTO accession does act to offset the in-
hibiting effect of cultural distance on these two categories of aggregate exports.
On the contrary, Column (2) shows that the interaction term casts a negative
effect on the exports of cultural goods from China. In other words, with re-
gard to the exports of cultural goods, China’s WTO accession does not seem
to mitigate the negative effect of cultural distance. One possible explanation
for this finding could be as follows. To the extent that cultural distance corre-
sponds to difference in cultural norms and values between two countries, the
exports of Chinese cultural goods are more sensitive to the intangible barriers
that are created by cultural distance. The benefit from entering WTO may
not outweigh the cost associated with cultural distance. This is in line with
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) [88] who emphasize the importance of intangible
barriers, including incomplete information barriers and cultural barriers, in
explaining the persistence of transactional distance between countries. From
a theoretical point of view, such transaction cost imposes a barrier to trade,
especially for the trade of cultural goods.
3.6 Conclusion
Chinese cultural goods constitute an increasingly important component in the
global market. This paper employs survival analysis to examine the duration
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of cultural goods export from China. We use the disaggregated product-level
data from 1995 to 2013 to explore the export dynamics of Chinese cultural
goods and investigate the underlying determinants.
Our findings provide trade economists and policy makers with a set of
interesting and surprising results. Firstly, we use the Kaplan-Meier product
limit estimator to estimate the survival function in a non-parametric way. We
show that the early stage of exporting relationship is characterized by the high
hazard rate. However, if Chinese cultural goods can survive in the foreign
market during the early stage, they will face a lower probability of failure
and tend to survive a longer period. Secondly, we use the Cox proportional
hazards model to derive semi-parametric estimates of the covariates that are
determining survival. We show that the initial export value significantly lowers
the hazard rate, and the cultural distance increases it but not in a significant
way. Thirdly, we further estimate how cultural distance affects the exports
of cultural goods and non-cultural goods under the gravity framework. It
is found that the cultural distance is more of an obstacle to the exports of
cultural goods and its impeding effect remains the same even after China’s
WTO accession. The intangible barriers created by cultural distance carry
the potential to increase the transaction costs and are more likely to hinder
the exports of Chinese cultural goods. Further study could examine in more
117
detail the influence of different constituent dimensions of cultural distance, in
order to shed more light on the relevance of different underlying mechanisms
that give rise to the trade patterns.
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Figure 3.1: Export value of cultural goods
Figure 3.2: China’s share in world exports of cultural goods
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of Chinese cultural goods export values by product-
importer pair
Figure 3.4: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
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Table 3.1: Cox regression
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Table 3.2: Estimation of gravity equation by OLS
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Table 3.3: Estimation of gravity equation by PPML
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Table 3.4: Cultural distance and exports from China
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Table 3A.4: The six dimensions of national culture
134
Table 3A.5: Cultural distance to China
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